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This paper is devoted to the description and the analysis of perfectly com-
petitive economies. From the literature there emerge two main appropaches
to perfect competition, both of which try to explain why agents in an ex-
change economy with a marketsystem or -mechanism are acting as price
takers. The Cournotian approach is based on limit results, which state that
in growing economies the Cournot- and~or Bertrand-competitive oligopolistic
equilibria are converging to perfectly competitive Walrasian equilibria.
The Edgeworthan approach is based on the Core-Walras-equivalence theory,
which investigates under which conditions certain core-like cooperative
equilibrium concepts are equivalent to the Walrasian competitive equi-
librium concept.
Our paper is written from the Edgeworthan point of view. We analyse
the conditions under which the semi-core, as developed in our previous
paper Gilles (198~), and the Walrasian equilibrium in a pure exchange
economy - with a coalitional structure of agents - are equivalent. We com-
pare the atomlessness condition with a property directly describing the
notion of perfect competition. Thus we are testing Aumann's statement that
an atomless economy is the natural expression of a perfectly competitive
economy. (Aumann (1964).) Through this comparison we introduce the
Cournotian approach into our analysis. We are able to prove, as one would
expect, that both approaches to perfect competition are equivalent. It also
turns out that atomlessness is usually a much stronger condition than per-
fectly competitiveness only.
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1. INTRODUCTION.
The main subject of this paper is Lhe description and analysis of the no-
tion of perfect competition in an exchange economy. The first rigourous
model of a perfectly competitive economy was constructed and formulated in
Arrow and Debreu (1954) and Debreu (1959). They presented a model with
production and a finite number of agents, who are all acting as price
takers. '1'he~ir main concern was however to establish the existence of a
Walrasian, i.e. perfectly competitive, equilibrium, and not the coticept of
perfect competition itself.
Other authors noted however two flaws with respect to the concept of
perfect competition in this original model. The first one is that the model
does not explain w~ the agents in the economy act as price takers. It is
simply assumed that all agents are acting on markets where the prices are
quoted and thus are regarded as given. (Agents are just acting as if they
cannot influence the market - and thus the marketprices - by adjusting
their behavior~actions on the market.)
The second flaw is closely related to the first one: The perfect com-
petition assumption is in contradiction with the assumption that there are
only a finite number of agents in the economy. If there are only a finite
number of rational agents active on the market, then one would expect that
these agents will assume that they are able to influence the market(-
prices) by adapting theír demand and~or supply. This would naturally lead
to a form of oligopolistic competition. (We refer to Hildenbrand (1983) for
a furLhcr cf iscussion oI' t.lrc Arrow-Debrcu model. )
Since the introduction oF the Arrow-Debreu model of a perfectly com-
petitive economy many authors have tried to find the solution to these
problems. This research has led to two main streams in the literature both
of which are trying to explain pricetaking behavior: The Cournotian and the
Edgeworthan approach to perfect competition. (We refer to Mas-Colell
(1982a) for some background.) We now discuss these approaches while focus-
ing on the situation in a pure exchange economy.
'I'he Cournotian approach is based on the intuitive understanding that if
agents in a market become sufficiently small, they will act as price
takers. 'I'his reasoning is fully based on the view that Lhe agent acts- 2 -
purely non-cooperative, i.e. individually, on the market. So if there are
enough agents acting on the market, an individual agent cannot influence
the market substantially by adjusting his~her demand or supply.
This intuitive argument is formalised in the limit theory on the
Cournot-competitive equilibria in an oligopolistic market (see for an over-
view Mas-Colell (1982b)), and more recently on the Bertrand-competitive
equilibria in an oligopolistic market (Allen and Hellwig (1986), and Simon
(1984)). In these papers it is generally proved that in a growing market,
sets of these kind of non-perfectly competitive equilibrium allocations
converge to the set of Walrasian equilibrium allocations. So it is formally
proved that in the limit, when all agents are negligible in the market,
every agent is acting as a price taker.
We stress that this approach is fully developed from the point of view
of a marketsystem in which all agents act individually, i.e. non-
cooperatively. The Bertrand and Cournot oligopolistic equilibrium concepts
are well suited to describe such situations.
The Edgeworthan approach is quite different from the Cournotian approach.
It gives a conceptual foundation to the notion of perfect competition
rather than a behavioristic one. It makes a comparison of the marketsystem
with a situation in which there are no markets but rather a more fundamen-
tal system based on threats generated by cooperative behavior of agents in
the economy. (Such a system requires a very high exchange of information
previous to the reallocation of the initial endowments.)
The reason for the Edgeworthan approach is nicely formulated by
Hildenbrand (1g83, p. 21): 'Competitive equilibrium analysis is based - as
is repeatedly emphasized - on the assumption that prices are "quoted" and
taken as given by every economic agent. For an economy consisting of rela-
tively few agents, this assumption - and hence the Walrasian equilibrium
state of the economy derived from it - is, however, hardly plausible.
Therefore let us consider an economy with many agents. Yet even in this
case, why is the "plausible" final state of the economy of the Walrasian
type? It seems clear that a satisfactory theoretical foundation af competi-
tive equilibrium theory requires another more fundamental equilibrium
concept that should be defined without reference to quoted prices and which3
is plausible even for small economies. The circumstances in which these
equilibria become Walrasian have then to be specified.'
The first major contribution to the Edgeworthen approach was made by
Debreu and Scarf (1963), who formalised the rudimental conjecture of
Fdgeworth that in a growing economy the core, an equilibrium concept which
is based on the threats of coalitions to reallocate their endowments, con-
verges to the set of Walrasian equilibrium allocations. This result is
later extended by Hildenbrand (1974) and Weiss (1981). (For a complete sur-
vey on core-theory we refer to fiildenbrand (1982).)
Ii~ our opinion the crux of the Edgeworthan approach is condensed in
the core-equivalence theory. There it is analysed under which circumstances
core-like equilibrium coiicepts, such as the core itself, are equivalent to
the Walrasian equilibrium concept. The first main contribution in this area
was made by Aumann (1g64 and 1966), who analysed a market with an atomless
measure space of "traders". He concluded that in an economy in which every
agent is negligible, the core and the Walrasian equilibrium concepts are
equivalent, i.e. in such an economy there is a conceptual foundation to
perfectly competitive behavior of agents. More recently this theory is ex-
tended to other core-like cooperative allocation mechanisms such as the f-
core (Kaneko and Wooders {1986a and 1986b), and Hammond, Kaneko and Wooders
(1987)). the semi-core and the contract-core (Gilles (1987)), and the bar-
gaining si~t (M~~s-Co1c11 ( 1y86) anc3 GrodaL (1986) ).
We stress that - in our opinion - the Edgeworthan approach is essen-
tially based not only on the individual characteristics of the agent, such
as endowment and preference, but mostly on the agent's abilities to
cooperate with other agents and the behavioristic characteristics involving
cooperation of agents. This point is not fully recognized by most authors
as mentioned above. (See also Gilles (1987).)
In this paper we analyse the notion of perfect competition in the set-
ting of an exchange economy with a coalitional structure of agents, firstly
presented in Gilles (1987). This is done from the Edgeworthan point of
view. Hence, the basis of our analysis is the equivalence result on the
semi-core and the Walrasian equilibrium concept as given in Gilles (1987).
First we discuss the model. The model is based on the primitive con-
cept of social agent, i.e. an economic subject with as well individual as
social chr.iracteristics. These soci.al characteristics describe the agent's4
abilities to cooperate with other agents, while the individual characteris-
tics are just the usual items such as endowment and preference. The social
characteristics of the agents are fully described by introducing the notion
of coalitional structure of agents. Within this concept we describe the
cooperation of agents in the economy in three subsequent steps. We give a
short overview of these steps:
- The first step describes the class of primitive coalitions. On this
level it is assumed that all participating agents of an primitive
coalition can be considered as natural partners; There is a very high
degree of interaction between agents within these primitive
coalitions. Thus it is assumed that these possibly overlapping groups
of agents can act as entities, i.e. a primitive coalition can act as
if it were a single, but mostly large agent. Now a coalitional struc-
ture is defined as a set of agents endowed with a class of primitive
coalitions, and a setfunction which assigns to every primitive coali-
tion some size.
- The second stage in the description of cooperative behavior of agents
is the definition of realízable coalitions. It is assumed that primi-
tive coalitions are able to communicate and cooperate with each other.
This assumption leads to an extension of the class of primitive coali-
tions, which just is the collection of all realizable coalitions.
(Formally, a realizable coalition is defined as the union of a finite
number of pairwise disjoint primitive coalitions.)
- The final step in the description process is the description of all
formable coalitions, i.e. groups of cooperating agents which are
feasible with respect to the structure as imposed by the class of
primitive coalitions on the set of all agents. (Thus an agent is seen
as embedded in a social structure as imposed by the coalitional
structure.)
Within the setting of this model we are able to define several core-like
equilibrium concepts. Firstly we define the core as the collection of those
attainable allocations, which cannot be blocked by any non-negligible
coalition. As argued in Gilles (198~) this concept is quite unnatural
within the context of our setting, because it assumes a very costly com-
munication structure: Every theoretically formable coalition is also
assumed to be formable in practice.5
To reduce this severe assumption level we define the semi-core as the
collection oF tliose attainable allocations which cannot be blocked by any
nun-nc}; I i i; i t, I r~ realizable coalition. 7'hus we reduce the communication
structure to the level of primitive coalitions only.
In Gilles (1987) it was established that if the economy is conformable
~n~9 ~tomless, then the semi-core is equivalent to the Walrasian equilibrium
concept, which involves the existence of a marketeconomy. In that paper it
was suggested that conformability is a kind of flexibility condition on the
coalitional structure, and that atomlessness is a description of
(Edgeworthan) perfect competitiori.
In the present paper we will formalise this interpretation. Moreover,
in the analysis of the atomlessness condition on an exchange economy we
will connect this property with the two fundamental approaches to perfect
competition, and thus we are establishing a comparison of both approaches.
(A first attempt to compare the Cournotian with the Edgeworthan approach to
perfect competition was made by Mas-Colell (19~,2a). He was however not able
to achieve a clear picture, because he did not recognize that social
characteristics are at least as fundamental to perfect competition as in-
dividual characteristics are.)
Our formal analysis consists of three main theorems. The first one
makes the connection of the conformability property and some flexibility
condition on the coalitional structure of an economy. It turns out that
conformability always implies that flexibility property, but that only un-
der some quite strong conditions these two are equivalent. It however
confirms that conformability may be interpreted as a strong kind of
flexibility of the coalitional structure.
As mentioned above our analysis of the atomlessness condition is
closely related to the two fundamental approaches of perfect competition.
In order to perform a detailed analysis, we define two kinds of perfect
competition in the setting of our model. Each one is an intuitive for-
malisation of one of these two approaches. Firstly, individual perfect
competition is defined as the property that every individual agent is neg-
ligible, i.e. it is a condensation of the Cournotian approach of perfect
competition. It gives a precise description of the notion of a"large"
economy as used frequently in the literature.-6-
Secondly, we define social perfect competition as a social plurifor-
mity condition on the coalitional structure. It is a formal condensation of
the intuitive Edgeworthan approach of perfect competition. It describes a
coalitional structure which is socially very pluriform, which precisely is
the intuitive feeling behind the equivalence results: In a very pluriform
society the (semi-) core will shrink to the set of Walrasian equilibrium
allocation, because there are very many (realizable) coalitions which have
blocking abilities.
Our second main theorem analyses these two descriptions of perfect
competition. It establishes that social perfect competition implies a
highly pluriform structure of the economy - which is also our intuitive in-
terpretation of this description -, but also that individual and social
perfect competition are describing the same notion. This justifies the
point of view that the Cournotian and Edgeworthan approaches of perfect
competition are dual. Both are describing the same subject, namely the
pricetaking behavior of the individual agent. (Again note that social and
individual perfect competition are based on completely different notions,
namely a conceptual point of view and otherwise an individualistic point of
view from a situation with a marketsystem.)
The third main theorem analyses the relationship of the atomlessness
condition and the perfect competition assumption as described above. It
turns out that atomlessness implies perfect competition, but that it is
considerably stronger than perfect competition only. Only under the severe
conformability property and some additional conditions there is equivalence
of atomlessness and perfect competition. This implies that nearly always
much more is needed to establish core-equivalence than perfect competition
only, as was suggested by Aumann (1964) and others. This result suggests
that we have to search for a more thorough interpretation to the atomless-
ness property. (Till now it is simply assumed that atomless economies are
the natural description of perfectly competitive economies.)
The paper is organized as follows: In the second section we will give
a description of the model and state the main equivalence result. Section 3
is devoted to the statement of the three main theorems and its
consequences. The paper is concluded with some examples.7
2. THE MODEL.
In this section we will present the framework in which we will analyse the
Edgeworthan approach of pefect competition, and especislly core-equivalence
as the formal basis of this approach. This framework is the model of an ex-
change economy first presented in Gilles (1987). Since this model is based
on the notion of social agent instead of individual agent, we are able to
perform an extensive analysis with respect to the social features, which
are imposed on an exchange economy to establish core-equivalence as men-
tioned above.
After defining an exchange economy with a coalitional structure of
agents, we introduce the notion of Walras equilibrium as a solution concept
in case of noncooperative behavior, and the core and the semi-core as the
solution concepts in case of cooperative behavior of agents.
Next we give the conditions under which these cooperative equilibrium
concepts are equivalent to the Walrasian equilibrium concept as proved
Aumann (1964) and Gilles (1987). (As mentioned in the introduction these
conditions are called conformability and atomlessness.) In the next section
this equivalence result will form the basis of our analysis of perfect com-
petition in connection with the atomlessness property.
'I'he definition of the primitive concept oF the model is based on the I'ol-
lowing mathematical notion:
2.1 Definition.
Let A be a set. Then a class of subsets of A, I' C.~ (A), is called a semi-
ring if it satisfies the following conditions:
róEi' ;
For every E,F E C: E`F, E n F E 4(I'),
where 52(i) :- { nUlEn ~ N E n, En E C' pairwise disjoint (1 ~ n C N) }.
0-8-
Based on the mathematical notion as defined above we build a three-stage
model of cooperative or social behavior of agents.
The first step is to describe the lowest level of cooperation between
agents. We do this by introducing the concept of primitive coalition. It
describes the basic particles of cooperation between agents in which these
interact in a very strong sense. We can índicate agents in such a context
as natural partners. Real life examples of such primitive coalitions are
institutions and~or organisations, but also less formal groups such as
families and clubs. (See for a detailed interpretation of this concept
Gilles (198~).)
As mentioned in the introduction and Gilles (1987), the primitive
concept oP the model is the social agent, i.e. an economic subject with as
well individual as social characteristics. Note that these social charac-
teristics describe the agent's abilities to cooperate with other agents.
Now if we make the fundamental assumption that the collection of primitive
coalitions forms a semi-ring on the set of all agents, then we can describe
these social characteristics of all agents with the use of the following
concept:
2.2 Definition.
The triple (A,I",k) is called a coalitional structure of aAents if
A is a set of individuals ,
I" is a semi-ring of primitive coalitions on A ;
N is a normalised measure on (A,T") , i.e. a setfunction ~: i" -~ R3
such that
(1) r~(ar) - 0
(2) sup { n~1N(En) I EnE I' (n E I1) pairwise disjoint }- 1
(3) If En E I" ( n E Ii) are pairwise disjoint and u E E I' , then n-1 n
K(n~l En) - n~l NÍEn).9
flence, a coalitional structure describes a class of social agents. Now the
notion of coalitional structure fully describes the socisl characteristics
of all agents in the economy, i.e. it describes the agents in the context
of their social environment. (We note that the mathematical counterpart of
a coalitional structure, which is an economic concept, is the notion of
"non-classical" measure space, which is also described by the triple
(A.r,u).)
The next step in the description process of cooperative behavior oF
agents is to extend the class of primitive coalitions to the class of
realizable coalitions 52(I'), which is the ring generated by the semi-ring of
primitive coalitions I' on the set of individuals. (52(I') is formally defined
in definition 2.1.) This collection consists of groups of agents formed by
cooperation of a finite number of pairwise disjoint primitive coalitions,
and thus these forms of cooperation are very realistic. (For a detailed
description we refer to Gilles (1987).)
The final stage in the description process of cooperative behavior is
to extend the class of realizable coalitions 4(i') to the collection of all
coalitions, which are feasible with respect to the coalitional structure.
This class is denoted by ï and it coincides with the collection of all
measurable subsets of the non-classical measure space (A,i',u). (See also
Janssen and van der Steen (1984) and Gilles (1987).) It is clear that ï is
a 6-algebra on the set of individuals such that (A,i,yt) is measure
theoretically complete, where u denotes the extension of H(on I") to ï.
If we assume that there are ~i commodities in the economy, then we can
describe the set of allocations in the economy as the class of all in-
tegrable functions from the non-classical measure space (A,I',yt), which is
seen as Lhe mathematical counterpart of the coalitional structure, to ttie
commodity space R~. (R~ describes the collection of all feasible commodity
bundles.) Thus the class of allocations is just described by the collection
L(~,R~) of all integrable functions from (A,I',y,) to R~.
Now we have all the tools to define an exchange economy. However
before doing so we note that all information of coalition formation and
feasible allocations of commodities is contained in the lowest social level
of the model, which is just described by the coalitional structure (A,ï,u).- 10 -
We further remark that it is clear that I" C Q(I') C ï, which in the sequel
will be used frequently.
2.3 Definition.
We define an exchange economv by the triple Ex :- [(A,i',u),(
?a)a E A'w~'
where
(A,i',u) is s coalitional structure of agents
Y a E A, is a preference relation on the commodity space R~ a~ ~
w E L(N,R~) is the endowment.
Thus in an exchange economy Ex every agent a E A has individual and social
characteristics. The individual characteristics consist of a preference on
the commodity space R~, and the endowment. The social characteristics are
represented by the coalitional structure: The agent is always seen in the
context of his~her environment. Note that this social environment is not
described only by the semi-ring of primitive coalitions I', but also by its
extensions, the classes of realizable and all feasible coalitions. Thus the
description of the social structure of Ex is not unambiguous, i.e. it is
done in several steps. (However, all information with respect to these
steps is contained in the coalitional structure.)
Next we define several equilibrium concepts in the setting of this
model. Denote by ~ the unit simplex in R~, which represents the set of all
pricevectors in Ex. ( Hence, A - { p E R~ ~ i pi - 1}.)
i
2.4 Definition.
Let Ex be an exchange economy, then we define the following equilibrium
concepts:
(a) (f,p) E L(N,R~) x A is a Walras eguilibrium if
f f dk ( J w dN and
A A- 11 -
f(a) E max { x E R~ ~ p.x C p.w(a) }, a.e. in A.
} -
a
Notation: f E W(E ).
x
(b) P E C(Ex) if f E L(u,R~), with f f dH C f w dk and there is no
coalition E E F, such that ( i) u(E) ~ 0 and (ii) there exists an
allocation g E L(y.,R~) for which
f g du ~ f w du and
E E
g(a) ~a f(a), s.e. in E.
C(Ex) is called the core of Ex.
(c) f E C(Ex) if f E L(k,R~), f f du ~ f w du and there is no
realizable coalition E E 4 I' such that (i) u(E) ~ 0 and (ii)
there is an allocation g E L(H,R~) for which
f g dK ( J w dg and
E E
B(a) ~a f(a). a.e in E.
C(Ex) is called the semi-core of Ex.
a
In an exchange economy Ex we can distinguish between two kinds of behavior:
non-cooperative and cooperative behavior. We will discuss those separately.
For the non-cooperative case the standard equilibrium concept is the
Walrasian concept. All agents barter on some central market at some price p
and their goal is to achieve a maximizing commodity bundle within their
budgetset. Now a Walras equilibrium is just a description of an equilibrium
situation in such a market economy. Therefore it consists of an allocation-
price pair at which every individual agent is satisfied and the markets are
cleared. ( Usually W(Ex) is called the set of Walrasian equilibrium
allocations.)- 12 -
Most traditional equilibrium concepts for the cooperative case are
based on the recontracting principle. While the Walras equilibrium concept
is fully based on the market system and individual behavior, the
recontracting principle involves cooperative behavior of the agents in the
economy. (Thus we may say that the social characteristics of the agents re-
place the marketsystem.) This involves much more information, especially
with respect to the social structure of the economy. In this respect the
recontracting principle is "expensive", while the marketsystem is "cheap".
The recontracting principle assumes that certain groups of agents are
able to generate a"threat" to leave the economy and re-allocate its
(initial) resources over its members. (For a detailed description and dis-
cussion of this principle we refer to Gilles (1987), Greenberg (1986),
Hammond, Kaneko and Wooders (1987) and Kaneko and Wooders (1986a and
1986b).)
Now the core is based on the assumption that every non-negligible
coalition is able to recontract and thus it consists of all attainable al-
locations against which there is no such objection (or threat). However as
argued in Gilles (1987) this assumption is hardly acceptable in the setting
of our model. Therefore the most natural adaption of this concept is to
reduce formation and information costs by assuming that only non-negligible
realizable coalitions are able to generate such threats. T'his leads to the
equilibrium concept of semi-core. Normally the semi-core is strictly larger
than the core and the set of Walrasian equilibrium allocations, but under
certain conditions there is equivalence of these concepts. We now formulate
the first of these conditions:
2.5 Definition.
(a) A coalitional structure of agents (A,I",K) is called (inner) confor-
mable if for every E E L:
u(E) - sup { y~(F) ~ E~ F E 52(i') }.
(b) An exchange economy Ex is called conformable if it has an ( inner) con-
formable coalitional structure of agents.
0- 13 -
In the next section we will give a detailed analysis of this notion. For
now we can give a first partial interpretation: It describes a situation in
which the semi-ring of primitive coalitions is so rich that most properties
with respect to E can be reduced (mostly without any distortion) to the
ring S2(i') and thus to i'. It is also clear that many economies with uncount-
able many agents do not satisfy this property, and in some respect this
means that these economies do not have a flexible structure. We will under-
line this "flexible structure"-interpretation of the conformability
condition by deriving some properties in the next section.
To establish full equivalence of all three equilibrium concepts as
defined in 2.4, we need also the next condition, which will be the main
subject of our analysis in the next section:
2.6 Def'inition.
An exchange economy Ex is called atomless if for every non-negligible
coalition E E ï with u(E) ~ 0, there exists a sub-coalition E~ F E i such
that
0 ~ u(F) C u(E).
Aumann (1964 and 1966) was the first to express perfect competition in an
exchange economy by using this property. He actually stated that an atom-
less exchange economy is the natural expression of a perfectly competitive
economy. This statement is the crux of the next section of this paper.
There we will prove that the atomlessness property is normally much
stronger than perfect competition only. As an example of the heavy claims
that atomlessness puts on economies we mention the fact that every atomless
economy has uncountable many agents. (This property and its consequences
for the existing theory are discussed thoroughly in Armstrong (1985). In
this connection we also mention Weiss (1981).)
Now we state the main equivalence results which form the foundation of
our analysis and the Edgeworthan approach of perfect competition.
2.7 Lemma. (Main equivalence theorem.)- 14 -
Let Ex be an exchange economy in which all agents have monotone and
measurable preferences. Then:
(a) If Ex is an atomless exchange economy, then W(Ex) - C(Ex).
(b) If Ex is a conformable and atomless exchange economy, then
W(Ex) - C(Ex) - C(Ex).
Proof.
For a proof of the first part of the lemma we refer to Aumann (1964) or
Hildenbrand (1974, 1982). The second part is proved in Gilles (1987). In
that paper it is also proved that the core as defined by Aumann (1964) and
used in the setting of Hildenbrand (1974 and 1982), is equal to the core as
defined in our setting.
We note that the major conditions, under which these main equilibrium con-
cepts are equivalent, are purely "structural", i.e. these conditions only
state something with respect to the (coalitional) structure on the set of
individuals. The purpose of this paper is to emphasize this feature and
thus to make a connection of the "structural" atomlessness and confor-
mability properties, and the "individual" perfect competition property.- 15 -
3 PERFECT COMPETITION AND COALITIONAL STRUCTURE.
In this section we will analyse conformable and atomless exchange economies
with respect to their coalitional (or social) structure. As noted in the
introduction atomless economies are generally seen as the natural expres-
sion of perfectly competitive economies. We will show that atomlessness is
usually a much stronger condition on the coalitional structure of an
economy than perfect competition only, and thus implementing perfect com-
petition into our analysis of this kind of economies. Before doing so we
first analyse the conformability property.
Our analysis is stated along the line of three main theorems. However,
we start off with a(technical) reduction of the two main conditions on the
coalitional structure which imply core-equivalence, as stated in lemma 2.~:
~.1 Lemma.
Let E be an exchange economy. x
(a) Ex is atomless if and only if there exists a number k E(0,1), siich
t}iat for every primitive coalition E E I', there exists a sequence of
pairwise disjoint primitive coalitions (Fn)n E t1 C i' such that
m
E - n~1Fn
u(Fn) ( k.u(E) , n E li.
(b) Ex is a conformable exchange economy if and only if for every se-
quence (Ek)k E n
C S2(C) and every E) 0, there exists a realizable
coalition E E Q(I') such that
E C
kni k
uík~l ~) ( u(E) t e
Proof.
For a proof of this lemma we refer to appendix A.2.
0- 16 -
The interpretation of this lemma is quite simple: The condition of an
economy of being atomless is equivalent to a covering condition on the
semi-ring of primitive coalitions, i.e. every primitive coalition can be
covered by a selection of strictly smaller primitive coalitions. Hence the
coalitional structure has to be very rich of relatively small primitive
coalitions, i.e. it has to be very dense. As we saw a similar interpreta-
tion can be given to conformability, but the two concepts are different:
Conformability prescribes that the primitive structure is dense relative to
the extended structure, while atomlessness prescribes that the coalitional
structure simply has to be dense in itself.
The second part of the lemma states that the conformability property
only has to be checked for a certain class of coalitions. This class con-
sists of intersections of sequences of realizable coalitions. Obviously,
this reduction is purely technical and does not have an interesting
economic interpretation.
The purpose of this section is to give an extensive analysis of the
economic content of the conformability and atomlessness properties, which
we will recognise as social properties, i.e. conditions on the coalitional
structure of the economy and not on the individual characteristics of the
agents. In the sequel we first will give a full economic interpretation of
the conformability condition, before we are able to analyse atomless
economies in connection with perfect competition.
In describing conformable coalitional structures we need some addi-
tional properties concerning participation of the economic agents in the
social organisation of the economy, and hence in the cooperative processes
in the economy:
3.2 Definition.
Let (A,I",u) be a coalitional structure of agents.
(a) (A,I',K) is called weakly participative if for every agent a E A there
exists a non-negligible primitive coalition E E I', with u(E) ~ 0, such
that a E E.- 1~ -
(b) (A,I',u) is called participative if it is weakly participative and ad-
ditionally every nonempty primitive coalition is non-negligible, i.e.
if E E C`{~}, then u(E) ~ 0.
(c) (A,i',u) is called strongly participative if it is participative and
additionally for every pair of disjoint agents a,b E A, with a~ b,
there exists a primitive coalition E E i" such that
(aEEandbfCE) or (a~EandbEE).
Weak participation prescribes a quite weak condition on the social or
coalitional structure of the economy. It describes a form of individual
participation in the economic processes, since in a weakly participative
structure every agent is assumed to be a member of at ]east one non-
negligible primitive coalition. Thus every agent in a weakly participative
coalitional structure is member of a primitive coalition with potential
blocking power. Hence, we may conclude that every agent in such a coali-
tional structure ís a participating social being and so we exclude all
"rolling stones", and other powerless individuals, in our analysis. (In
mathematical terms we assume that the set of rolling stones is empty, i.e.
{ a E A ~ d E E I' : a E E~ u(E) - 0 }- e~.)
In a participative coalitional structure there is, besides this in-
dividual participation as described above, another form of social
participation: Every nonempty primitive coalition is non-negligible, i.e.
has potentially blocking power. Hence, we exclude unimportant, negligible
groups of agents from being primitive coalitions. Contrary to the natural
character of the weak participation condition, the participation property
is quite strong, especially in perfectly competitive economies. Although
primitive coalitions are the basic particles of social cooperation of
agents, it is not credible that all primitive coalitions should be non-
negligible.
With respect to strong participation we may draw the conclusion that
this is indeed a very strong condition: It prescribes full participation of
every (individual} agent, i.e. individual as well as social participation
as well as social separation. Any pair of agents can be socially separated,
and thus any agent is independent in the sense that he~she principally can- 18 -
counterobject any action of any other agent by activating some (naturally
non-negligible) primitive coalition of which he~she is a member. Hence,
every agent is a fully participating member of the economy.
With these tools, as defined above, we are able to present our first
main result concerning the description of the conformability condition on
the coalitional structure of an exchange economy:
~.3 Proposition.
Let Ex be an exchange economy. Then the following statements are
equivalent:
(a) Ex is not conformable.
(b) There is a sequence of realizable coalitions
(En}n E n
C 52(I'} such
that En}1 C En, En`Entl E I" (n E h), and u(E) ) 0, where E:- n E
n-1 n
E E, and there exists a number b E(O,k(E)) such that for every
realizable coalition F E 4(i') :
If F C E, then K(F) ~ b.
Proof.
For a proof of this proposition we refer to appendix A.3.
With the use of this proposition, which has a considerable interest on its
own, we are able to prove the first main theorem, which provides us with an
economically useful account of the conformability property.
3.4 First main theorem.
Let Ex be an exchange economy.
(a) If Ex has a(inner) conformable coalitional structure, then for every
non-negligible coalition E E ï with ~.t(E) ~ 0, there is a nonempty
primitive subcoalition F E I'`{rd} such that F C E and u(F) ) 0.- 19 -
(b) IF Ex has a participative coalitional structure of agents, then E is
x
conformable if and only if for every non-negligible coalition E E ï
there exists a nonempty primitive coalition F E I"`{~} such that F C E.
Proof.
For a proof of this theorem we refer to appendix A.4.
Proposition 3.3 is a refinement of lemma 3.1(b) and therefore it is
economically less interesting - and important - as theorem 3.4. However, we
can distract some economically relevant information from this proposition.
It turns out that in a non-conformable economy there exists a sequence of
neatly shrinking realizable coalitions, such that the group of agents, who
are member of any of those coalitions, contains a substantial group of non-
communicating agents. (This communication is of course meant in the sense
of natural partnership as described in the introduction and Gilles (1987).)
This is contradictory to the "spirit" of our setting, and therefore in this
sense the conformability property seems quite natural and logical. This
also learns that in non-conformable economies there is something hampering
the free communication between agents and primitive coalitions.
This observation is confirmed by our first main theorem 3.4, which
states that in any exchange economy conformability implies a flexibility
property on the coalitional structure. Secondly, under the participation
condition conformability is even equivalent to that particular flexibility
property. The flexibility property prescribes that any non-negligible
coalition contains at least one non-negligible primitive subcoalition. And
thus every non-negligible coalition contains a group of agents who are
natural partners of each other in the sense as described in Gilles (198~)
and the previous sections. A more technical interpretation of this theorem
is that it states that in a conformable exchange economy the primitive
structure is dense, or a base, in the extended structure of all formable
coalitions. (This underlines the character of the conformability property
as a flexibility condition on the coalitional structure.)
3.5 Definition.
Let (A,I",N) be a coalitionel structure.-zo-
(a) If a E A, then i"a :- { E E I' ~ a E E} is called the social environ-
ment of a.
(b) Two agents a,b E A are called socially equivalent if for every
primitive coalition E E I':
aEE~bEE.
Notation: a ~ b.
We note that I'a describes the social characteristic of an agent a in A. As
mentioned in the previous section a member of a coalitional structure has
individual as well as social characteristics. Individual characteristics
are usually endowment and a preference relation, while the social charac-
teristic is fully described by his~her social environment. As mentioned
earlier, this social environment is constructed in an extension procedure
as described in section 2. However it is clear that all information of this
environment is contained in the coalitional structure, and thus the defini-
tion of a social environment as given above is justified: The social
environment of an agent is fully described by his~her memberships of primi-
tive coalitions. Thus the collection I'a, where a E A is some agent, also
describes the relationships with the other agents in the coalitional
structure: It shows exactly with whom the agent a E A is a natural partner.
The introduced social equivalence relation is obviously a mathematical
equivalence relation on the set of agents. By definition two agents are so-
cially equivalent if we cannot distinguish these two agents only by looking
at their social characteristics which are fully described by their social
environment, and hence we can only distinguish these agents by taking their
total characteristic into account. If we assume that normally we are not
able to observe the individual characteristics of an agent, then two so-
cislly equivalent agents cannot be distinguished at all. (There is no
social key to the individual agent.)
It may be clear that in a strongly participative coalitional structure
of agents it is possible to identify every single agent by only observing
the social structure of the economy. In more formal terms: In a strongly- 21 -
participative economy no agent is socially equivalent to any other agent,
and thus there is a unique social key to every indívidual agent.
'1'o cc~mplc~LC lhe de~;cript.ion of the int.c~oduced socinl equivalence reln-
tion we d~~note by ,y t.hc~ collection ot' rcl I socinl e uivalence classes on
A. Formally:
y:- { ECA ~ E~~, va,bEE : a~band
~ F E~ such that F;~ E and F C E }.
From mathematics it is clear that y is a partition of A and from the
definition of the social equivalence relation ~ it is clear that this par-
tition is closely related to the coalitional structure of the economy.
Therefore it has some nice economic interpretations which will be explored
in the subsequent paragraphs.
The following proposition provides us with a clear view on the nature
of the social equivalence relation.
3.6 Proposition.
Let (A,1',u) be a weakly participative coalitional structure of agents and
let a,b E A be two agents. Then the following statements are equivalent:
(a) a~b
(b) There exists a social equivalence class E E y such that a,b E E.
(c) I"a - 1"b.
(d) T'a C I'b.
Proof.
It is qicit.e clear from the definitions that. (a), (b) and (c) are
cquivalr.nt.. It is also qulte ca ear thFlt (d) Collows Il~om (c). We now wlll
prove that ( d) implies ( c), thus establishing equivalence between all
statements.
AssumeFEI'andbEF, buta4~F.- 22 -
Now choose E E I" with a E E. (Such a primitive coalition exists by the
definition of the weak participation property.) But then b E E, since by
assumption I'a C I"b. Thus b E E n F and a E E`F. By semi-ring assumptions
there exists a primitive coalition G E I' with a E G C E`F. But then b~ G.
This contradicts the assumption that i"a C I'b.
Proposition 3.6 does not only confirm our previous remark on social iden-
tification, but also provides us with a handy technical reduction of the
social equivalence relation, given by statement (d). It states that we only
have to observe one agent in relation to the other agent to establish
whether or not they are socially equivalent. Thus if one agent is always
the natural partner of the other agent, then those agents are socially
equivalent. (There is no need to check whether the other agent is always
the natural partner of the first one.)
Social equivalence is a property which we will use to describe the
consequences of the atomlessness condition for a conformable economy. We
will show that this form of (social) relationship between agents is cru-
cially interconnected with the basíc idea of perfect competition itself,
and therefore with the atomlessness condition on an exchange economy. With
the use of this relationship we are able to describe the social conse-
quences of the perfect competition property - or the atomlessness property
- for the coalitional structure of the economy, and therefore for the so-
cial organisation of economic activities. This is fully described in the
second main theorem of this paper.
Before we state this second main theorem, we introduce a technical in-
strument which gives us some interesting properties on the classes of
socially equivalent agents as described in y.
3.7 Definition.
Let (A,I',~) be a coalitional structure.
The setfunction v:.`~(A) -~ Rt which is defined by
v(E) :- inf { u(F) I E C F E ï }
for every subset, E C A, is called the outer measure of (A,i' u).-23-
The outer measure of some coalitional structure just gives to any group of
agents a size in harmony with the coalitional structure. In fact for every
E C A, there exists a coalition F E i such that E C F and u(F) - v(E).
(Firstly observe that A E ï and hence { F E i ~ E C F} t rd. Now take a se-
quence of coalitions
(Fn)n E ry C F with u(Fn) ,~ v(E) and E C Fn (n E fl),
then F:- n Fn does the trick.) This coalition is the smallest one in which
the group E is contained. From the traditional Caratheodory extension
theory we learn that E C A is a coalition if and only if v(F) - v(E n F) t
v(E`F) for every group of agents F C A. From measure theory it is also
clear that if E C A and v(E) - 0, then E is a nullset, i.e. E E ï and u(E)
- 0. (See Halmos (1950), Zaanen (1961 and 1967), or Aliprantis and
Rurkinshaw (1981).)
The following proposition combines this outer measure with the
analysis of the coalitional structure by using the social equivalence
relation:
3.8 Proposition.
Let (A,I',u) be a coalitional structure and let ,y C` .P(A) be the collection
of all social equivalence classes in (A,I',u).
(a) If E E y and a; ~ F C E, then v(F) - v(E).
Now assume that (A,i,}~) is weakly participative.
(b) If E,F E y are two distinct equivalence classes, i.e. E~ F, then
there exist two primitive coalitions H,G E I" such that
ECH , FCGandHnG-O.
(c) ,y- { ni'a ~ aEA }.
(d) If I' is countable, then y C E.
Proof.
For a proof of this proposition we refer to appendix A.S.-24-
Since the outer measure denotes every group of agents with some
(artificial) size which is based on the coalitional structure, we can in-
terpret proposition 3.8(a) as a natural consequence of the social
equivalence relation: Socially equivalent agents cannot be identified in-
dividually with the use of the coalitional or social structure of the
economy only. Even the artificial size of these groups of agents, estab-
lished by using the outer measure, is undetermined on the lowest level:
Beyond the level of social equivalence we cannot distinguish any non-
trivial information on the size of a group of agents.
Proposition 3.8(b) is a separation property: Every pair of equivalence
classes can be strictly separated in the coalitional structure. This
property has two important consequences. Firstly, again it confirms that,
although these social equivalence classes are the lowest level which is
identifiable, we are able to identify those classes complete~. Secondly,
any group of socially equivalent agents is in principle able to counterob-
ject any action of some other social equivalence class by activating some
primitive coalition, i.e. a group of natural partners of those socially
equivalent agents. In other words, any social equivalence class can or-
ganize a counteraction to some action initiated by some other social
equivalence class in the setting of the existing coalitional structure.
Finally proposition 3.8(c) gives us a full description of the collec-
tion of all social equivalence classes in the coalitional structure
(A,I",u). Although we will not use this description in our analysis, it
gives us a tool for further analysis of the social aspects of an economy
with a coalitional structure. Moreover it confirms our remark that a social
environment is a(social) key to zhe individual. The class of social en-
vironments fully describes the collection of all sets of socially
equivalent agents in the economy. -
Before we link the notion of atomless exchange economy into our analysis we
first study the concept of perfect competition. We note, as mentioned in
the introduction, that there are two principally different approaches to
perfect competition. The next definition gives a formalisation of the in-
tuitive feeling behind those approaches.-25-
3.9 Definition.
Let Ex be an exchange economy.
(a) F? is eailled indívidually~crfectly competitive if every individual x - -
agent is negligible, i.e. for every agent a E A it holds that {a} E E
and u({a}) - 0.
(b) Ex is called socially perfectly competitive i f every social equiv-
nlen~~e clttsti is negligible, i.e, for every socin] equivalence cla9s F
E y, E E L and u(E) - 0.
As mentioned in the introduction there are two principally different ap-
proaches to perfect competition. Both the Cournotian and the Edgeworthan
approach are reflected in the definition above and the two subsequent main
theorems.
The Cournotian approach is based on the individual agent ín the set-
ting of a marketsystem. It describes the intuitive feeling that in a market
with many agents, i.e. a market in which all agents are negligible, they
behave as price takers. (Negigible agents cannot influence the prices on
the mnrkets by adjusting their behavior.)
Now the concept of individual perfect competition is a formcil reflec-
tion of this intuitive approach. It simply describes an exchange economy
which is so large that all agents are individually negligible. Although the
intuitive reason of this definition is purely individualistic, the formal
condensation turns out to be a feature of the coalitional structure.
The second, more conceptual, foundation of perfect competition is the
Edgeworthan approach. As described in the introduction it compares a
Walrasian equilibrium situation in a marketsystem with an equilibrium con-
cept based on more fundamental notions. This approach is mainly condensed
in the core-equivalence theory in which it is stated under which conditions
a(mostly core-like) cooperative equilibrium concept generates Walrasian
equilibrium allocations, i.e. allocations which are achieved in a situation
with perfectly competitive markets. From this theory we arrive at the main
intuitive conclusion that if there is a high level of social activity in-26-
the economy, such a core-like equilibrium concept will generate perfectly
competitive equilibrium allocations.
In an economy with a coalitional structure this condenses in the in-
tuitive feeling that to achieve perfect competition, the coalitional
structure has to be very pluriform. This is formalised in our definition of
social perfect competition. It describes a situation of a highly pluriform
society, i.e. there are many coalitions in the economy which potentially
can generate threats. (Hence in such a situation the (semi-) core is likely
to shrink to the set of Walrasian equilibrium allocations.) Note that this
definition is based on the social characteristics of the agents in the
coalitional structure. Hence, the foundations of this form of competition
are completely different from those of the notion of individual perfect
competition.
The next theorem will formalise the intuitive feeling that both of these
two completely different approaches to perfect competition describe the
same notion. In fact both approaches seem to be dualistic. (This duality
can also be formalised as will be done in a subsequent paper.)
3.10 Second main theorem.
Let Ex be an exchange economy.
(a) If Ex is socially perfectly competitive, then for every non-negligible
primitive coalition E E I', with N(E) ~ 0,
~t { F E y ~ F C E}) 2
(b) Ex is individually perfectly competitive if and only if Ex is socially
perfectly competitive.
Proof.
For a proof of this theorem we refer to appendix A.6.
a
The first part of our second main theorem states that perfect competition
in the Edgeworthan sense always implies a socially pluriform coalitional-27-
structure underlying the economy. As remarked above, this is a very natural
consequence from the intuitive point of view in the Edgeworthan approach~
To let shrink a core-like, cooperative equilibrium concept to the set of
Walrasian equilibrium allocations one needs a very high social plurifor-
mity, i.e. one needs a lot of coalitions which potentially are able to make
a threat to block certain proposed allocations. The second part of the
theorem shows that our intuition, that both approaches to perfect competi-
tion are equivalent, is justified. It also formalises the intention of Mas-
Colell (1982a) to show that both approaches are equivalent.
From the result in the second part of theorem 3.10 in the sequel we
will only speak of perfectly competitive exchange economies. A reference to
which of both approaches is meant, is no longer needed in the formulatíon
of our next main theorem.
Aumann (1964) already stated that an atomless economy is the natural
expression for a perfectly competitive exchange economy. Now we have for-
malised the definition of perfect competition in an economy with a
coalitional structure, we will test this statement of Aumann on its
validity in our setting. The next theorem focusses on the relationship be-
tween atomlessness and perfect competition.
3.11 Third main theorem.
Let Ex be an exchange economy.
(a) If Ex is atomless, then Ex is perfectly competitive.
In the sequel let Ex be such that for every non-negligible coalition E E i
with x(E) ) 0, there exists a non-negligible primitive subcoalition F E i',
where u(F) ) 0 and F C E.
(b) Ex is atomless if and only if for every non-negligible primitive
coalition E E i', with y~(E) ) 0, there exists a primitive subcoalition
F E I' such that
F C E and 0( u(F) ~ N(E).-z8-
(c) Let Ex have a participative coalitional structure. Then the following
statements are equivalent:
(i) Ex is atomless.
(ii) Ex is perfectly competitive.
(iii) For every nonempty primitive coalition E E i"`{~s} :
~{ F E y ~ F C E}) 2.
Proof.
For a proof of this theorem we refer to appendix A.7.
Our third main theorem gives a full account of the atomlessness property in
connection with perfect competítion.
The first part states that atomlessness always implies perfect
competition. But, as examples in the next section will show, in most cases
this implication is strict. So we may conclude that atomless economies may
form the natural description of perfectly competitive economies, but that
in most cases this description is stronger than would be expected.
The second part of the theorem states that, under the flexibility
property as formulated in our first main theorem 3.4, atomlessness is
equivalent to its technical definition reduced to the semi-ring of primi-
tive coalitions instead of the a-algebra of all (formable) coalitions. It
shows that the reducing power of the conformability property, which is also
mentioned in Gilles (1987), is valid for the atomlessness property. It also
shows that in conformable and atomleas economies the primitive structure is
very dense in itself, and hence very pluriform. This coincides with the
statements made in theorem 3.10(a) and 3.11(a), which describe the social
pluriform character of atomless economies.
The final statement of the theorem is a full equivalence result, which
justifies Aumann's statement that atomless economies are the natural
description of perfectly competitive economies. The conditions on the
economy which garantee this equivalence are however very strong. In fact we
can call them "extremely" strong: It even is not yet clear if theoretically-29-
there exists an economy which is as well conformable as participative as
atomless. It' the existence of such an economy is denied, then it is quite
plausible to state that atomlessness is a much heavier burden on an economy
than perfect competition only.
However until that existence problem is solved, we can restate our
main core-equivalence theorem with the use of 3.11(c) in the following
corollary, which forms the basis of the Edgeworthan approach of perfect
competition.
~.12 Corollary.
Let Ex be an exchange economy in which all agents have monotone and
measurable preferences, and let Ex have a participative coalitional struc-
ture of agents.




In this section we present some counterexamples supplementary to the three
main theorems as presented in the previous section.
4.1 Example.
In this example we will construct an economy which is (indívidually and
socially) perfectly competitive and has a weakly participative coalitional
structure, but which is neither atomless nor conformable.
First we construct the following coalitional structure of agents (A,I',u):
A is a set of uncountable many individuals.
We define the following semi-ring of primitive coalitions on that set
of individuals: I" :- {ró} u~ u~ , where
` .~ .- { F C A ~ F is a finite subset of A};
iG :- { A` F ~ F E~ }.
We complete the construction of the coalitional structure by defining
the following measure u: T' ~[0,1] given by
u(~) :- 0
u(F) :- 0 F E ~
u(H) : - 1 H E ~
Now (A,I',u) is a coalitional structure of agents. Next we define Ex as a
pure exchange exchange with a coalitional structure as described above.
(Note that Ex does not consist of agents with particular individual
characteristics. We have only described the social characteristics of the
agents in Ex, i.e. the agents abilities to cooperate with each other.)
We arrive at the following properties with respect to the exchange
economy Ex as defined above:
(a) It is clear that Ex has a weakly participative coalitional structure,
which is however not participative.- 31 -
(b) It is also quite evident that ~r -{{a} I a E A}- by application of
proposition 3.8(c) -, and thus it is clear that Ex is socially and in-
dividually perfectly competitive. (We note that, however the economy
is degenerated, all agents are negligible and thus also on intuitive
grounds we cannot deny that Ex is not perfectly competitive.)
(c) RX is neither atomless nor conformable. The first statement is
trivially clear, but the second has to be shown more formally.
Therefore we use proposition 3.3:
We note that for any sequence of primitive coalitions (H ) C i~ C
n n E H
C such that Hk ~ H1, k~ 1, it is clear that
H:- nnl Hn E E and K(H) - 1.
Otherwise it is quite clear that if H~ E E I'`{~}, then E E` .~ , and
thus we conclude that
v E E Q(I") : E C H ~ yt(E) - 0 .
Thus we may conclude, by application of proposition 3.3(b), that the
exchange economy Ex is not conformable.
(d) Finally we remark that for any non-negligíble primitive coalition E E
i' with u(E) ) 0, there exists a primitive subcoalition which is non-
negli.gible, but strictly smaller than E, i.e. there is an F E C with F
C I: nn~i O ( N,(f~) ( N(I?).
We are now able to draw some conclusions with respect to the exchange
economy E :
x
Properties (c) and (d) show that theorem 3.11(b) does not have to be
true if Ex is not conformable, and thus some conformable-like condit-
ion cannot be missed in the formulation of that assertion.
Secondly, we note that again from properties (c) and (d) it can be
learned that the relationship between (social and~or individual) per-
fect competition and atomlessness may be strict for economies which
are not conformable and participative. In this special case we have an-32-
exchsnge economy which is perfectly competitive, but which is not
atomless. Thus we have constructed an economy which on basis of the
Cournotian and Edgeworthan intuitive approaches give reason to the
agents in the economy to act as pricetakers, but the economy is not
atomless. This shows that normally atomlessness implies much more than
perfect competition only. (For instance it provides the economy with a
substantial collection of attainable allocations, while in this
degenerated example the collection of attainable allocations is very
small. Hence, although this example shows that atomlessness is more
than perfect competition only, it also shows that Aumann's verdict is
still valid, since only pathological examples establish an economy
which is perfectly competitive, but which is not atomless.)
a
4.2 Example.
In this example we will construct a strongly participative coalitional
structure such that with the use of an exchange economy with that par-
ticular coalitional structure, we can analyse our third main theorem more
thoroughly.
First we define the following coalitional structure:
A .- [0,.5) C R ;
i' :- {r~} u { [a,b) ~ 0 ~ a ~ b ~ .5 } ,
x: I' -~ [0,1] is given by
- I .5tb ifa-0 u([a.b)) : 1 b- a if s~ 0
It is clear that the triple (A,I",K) is a coalitional structure of agents.
Now we define Ex as an exchange economy with this coalitional structure. It
is easy to show that this economy is not perfectly competitive. (Note that-33-
{0} E i and that its size y.({0}) - 0.5.) We observe however that the fol-
lowing properties are true for this exchange economy:
(a) Ex is not conformable.
As noted above {0} E L`i' and u({0}) - 0.5, and thus it cannot be ap-
proximated by sequence of subsets in 4(C) as is defined in the
definition of conformability 2.5. So Ex cannot be conformable.
(b) (A,I',N) is a strongly participative coalitional structure. Observe
that for any pair of disjoint agents a,b E[0,.5) we may assume,
without loosing any generality, that a( b. Now we note that a and b
are strictly separated by the primitive coalitions [a, (a t b)~2 ) and
[(a t b)~2. 0.5).
Moreover for any nonempty primitive coalition E E 1"`{~s} it holds that
u(E) ) 0, and thus we may conclude that the coalitional structure is
strongly participative.
(c) For every nonempty primitive coalition E E I'`{~s} there exists a primi-
tive subcoalition E~ F E C such that 0 C u(F) ~ u(E).
(d) Note also that ~r -{{a} I a E A} and thus for any nonempty primitive
conlition E E i'`{~} it holds that
M{ FE~r I FC E}- m
Since Ex is not atomless we learn from properties ( a) and (c) that the
statement of theorem 3.11(b) is not true if Ex is not conformable. Thus
conformability is a necessity.
Secondly we observe that from the properties (a), (b) and (d) it can
be concluded that the assertion of theorem 3.11(c) is not true if the
economy does not fulfill the conformability property, even in the case that
the economy has a strongly participative coalitional structure.
0-34-
5. CONCLUSIONS.
The analysis as presented in this paper is essentially twofold.
Firstly, we observed that the main conditions which establish the
equivalence of the semi-core and the Walrasian equilibrium concept have es-
sentially s social content, i.e. these conditions are only considering the
social structure or organisation of the economy. This observation is mainly
reflected in the first main theorem and the analysis of the atomlessness
condition as presented in theorem 3.11(b). Our observation is also con-
firmed by the remarks of Scmeidler (19~2), Grodal (19~2) and Vind (19~2) on
the core, and the f-core approach as presented in Hammond, Kaneko and
Wooders (1987).
The second essential observation which we make in this paper, is that
atomlessness as the natural reflection of perfect competition is not one
hundred percent justified. (We actually showed that there still may be some
angles with respect to this interpretation of an atomless economy.) To per-
form our analysis, we noted that there are principally two ways to approach
perfect competition in the setting of an exchange economy. Both the
Cournotian and the Fdgeworthan approach are reflected in our (dusl) defini-
tion of perfect competition in an economy with a coalitional structure of
agents: We distinguished an individual as well as a social definition, both
of which are an intuitive reflection of one of those two approaches of per-
fect competition. Next we showed that both, principally different,
approaches are equivalent and that atomlessness normally only implies per-
fect competition and not the other way round. However under severe
additional conditions, we showed that there is an equivalence of atomless-
ness and perfect competition.
From both observations, as described above, we can arrive at some importent
conclusions.
First we remark that both observations lead to the conclusion that the
Edgeworthan approach of perfect competition is mainly based on the social
or coalitional structure of the economy. This approach is condensed in the
main core-equivalence theorems. These show that in a socially flexible and
pluriform (or perfectly competitive) society an equilibrium concept, based-35-
on cooperative behavíor only, arrives at the same allocations as a market-
system would do. All conditions in such e theorem are purely social, which
is conform the expectations of the Edgeworthan approach: The information
contained in the social structure of the economy has to be large enough to
match up with the information-efficient Walrasian marketsystem, which only
needs individual information. (In such a marketsystem agents act completely
individually.)
Secondly we conclude that our observations as mentioned above justify
our dualistic approach in describing an agent as an economic subject with
as well individual as social characteristics. (This duality can be for-
malised, as will be done in a subsequent paper.) Therefore our model fits
the dual approach of perfect competition as is described by the Cornotian
and Fdgeworthan approaches completely. So we conclude that our model
provides a very fruitful environment to analyse and compare both approaches
of perfect competition. Such a comparison was also intended by Mas-Colell
(1982a), but the traditional setting which he used, did not capture this
duality of individual and social features of the behavior of the agents in
the economy. The social characteristics have to be recognized as being at
least as important as the individual ones.
Finally we note that there is this existence problem of an economy
which is as well perfectly competitive as conformable as participative.
(Our third main theorem shows that such an economy also has to be
atomless.) The condition that an exchange economy has to fulfill all three
of these properties is very severe. It is my conjecture that even if there
exists such an exchange economy, it is only a pathological one. (For the
special case of continuum economies, we refer to a forthcoming paper which
shows that it is nearly impossible to establish the conformable character
of such an economy.)-36-
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APPENDIX
In this appendix we will give the proofs of the main theorems as prese~ited
in section 3. First we state a basic lemma which nearl all y proofs are
based on.
A.1 Lemma.
Let (A,C,u) be a coalitional structure of agents, and let F E E be a
coalition. For every E ~ 0 there exists a sequence
(En)n E n C r of pair-
wise disjoint primitive coalitions such that
~
F C nulEn
n~l ~(En) ~ yt(F) ; e
a
For a proof of this lemma we refer to Janssen and van der Steen (1984) in
which i t is presented as lemma 3.3.5.
A.2 Proof of lemma 3.1.
This proof is largely based on lemma A.1.
(a) Let (A,I',u) be a coalitional structure.
Only iF: Let E E i' with u(E) ~ 0 and k E(0,1).
We define ko:-k~2.u(E) ~ 0. Now we construct the following partition:-40-
Because (A,i,u) is an atomless measure space, by Liapunov's theorem,
we can choose a(feasible) coalition E~ E1 E E with u(E1) - ko.
Let Ek be chosen, then Ek}1 is constructed in the following way:
k k
If y~(E`nulEn) C ko , then choose
Ekt1:- E`n~lEn'
k
If u(E`nulEn) ) ko , then choose ( again by applying Liapunov's
k
theorem) Ek{1 C E`nulEn such that ~(Ektl) - ko.
The constructed partition is finite because u(E) C u(A) - 1 and ko )
N
0, thus E- nulEn with u(En) C ko (1 C n C N).
Let 1 C n C N and now apply lemma A.1 as follows:
Choose for En a disjoint sequence
(Fnk)k E ry C r such that
En C k~1F~ and n~l
k(Fnk) C~(En) } ko '
It is evident that we can take all F~ C E, because En C E E[' and I"
N ~
is a semi-ring. Hence E- n~l k~1Fnk ~d ~(Fnk) C u(En)}ko ( 2ko -
k.u(E).
IP: Let k E(0,1) be as described in the theorem. Let E E F be such
that y~(E) ) 0 and take 0 C e C(1-k)k(E). By lemma A.1 there exists a
non-negligible primitive coalition F E I'`{~} with u(F) ~ 0 such that
u(F n E) ) 0 and p(F) C u(E) t e.
Now by using the property as described in the theorem, we can choose a
sequence
(Fn)n E ry C r such that u(Fn) C k.u(F) and F- u F. Then - n-1 n- 41 -
there exists an element Fk of that sequence such that u(Fk n E) ) 0
and thus
0( x(Fk n E) ( u(Fk) ~ k.u(F) ~ k-u(E).k.E ~ k.~(E) t E C N(E).
Now Fk n L has the desired atomlessness property.
(b) Only if: This is trivial since 6(r) C ï and in the assertion of the
theorem a sub-collection of o(r) is treated in the same way as ín the
definition of conformability.
If: Let E E ï with N(E) ~ 0. We now will show that
u(E) - sup { y~(G) ~ E~ G E S2(r) }.
(It is clear that we only have to check for coalitions with size
u(E) ~ 0, since ~ E r C Q(r).)
Now choose E) 0. According to lemma A.1 there is a sequence
(Fn)n E ti
C r of pairwise disjoint primitive coalitions such that
E C nv1Fn and n~1N(Fn) ( N(E) . E.
Thus E- nul(E n Fn).
Now we claim that for every n E Ii there is a coalition Hn E S2(r) such
that
Hn C E n Fn and N(E n Fn) ~ u( Hn) , 2-n-1.E
Assume this claim is true, then the proof of the conformability
property is quite easy. Namely, then there exists a sequence (Gk)k E ti
C r of' pairwise disjoint primitive coalitions such that-42-
kul Gk C E and
NÍE) - n~1N(E n Fn) ~ n~lu(Hn) 4 E~2 - k~lu(Gk) . e~2.
(Since Hn is the union of a finite number of primitive coalitions and
the Fn's are pairwise disjoint, we can split the Hn's into primitive
coalitions to get such a sequence
(Gk)k E ry C I" with the properties
stated above.)
Now choose N E ry such that i u(Gk) C e~2. (Such a number exists be-
k-Nt1 -
cause n~1K(Gk) C K(E) ~ 1.) Now choose G:- k~1Gk E S2(I"), then G C E
and A(E) ~ u(G) t É u(Gk) { E~2 ~ K(G} . E.
- k-Nt1 -
Since the choice of E~ 0 is arbitrarily we get that
k(E) - sup { u(G) ~ E~ G E 4(I") },
and thus conformability is proved if we prove the claim. We will prove
the claim in a slightly more general setting:
Claim: Let E E ï, F E L" with F n E~etó , and ó) 0 be arbitrarily
chosen. We now show that there exists a coalition H E S2(C) such
that
H C E n F and u(E n F) ~ y~(H) t b.
Evidently we may assume that u(E n F) ) 0, since otherwise we can
choose for H the empty set. But then there exists, by lemma A.1, a se-
quence
(Cn)n E ry C r of pairwise disjoint primitive coalitions such
that
F`E C nu1Cn and n~1R(Cn) ~ u(F`E) f ó~2.-43-
k
Now define Hk :- F`(nu1Cn) E Q(I'). (Since I' is a semi-ring and F E i'.)
`1'hen
kn1Hk - F`(nu1Cn) C E n F and u(kn1Hk) - 1~(F`(nu1Cn)) ~
~ N(F)-n~lu(Cn) ~ N(F) - N(F`E) - b~2.
Thus u(F n E) C k(kn1Hk) t b~2. Now we use the assertion of the
theorem to get a coalition H E Q(I") with H C kn1Hk and yt(kn1Hk) ~
u(H) t b~2.
NowHCEnFandu(EnF) ( N(H) t b .
a
A.~ Proof of proposition 3.3.
Let (A,i',N) be a coalitional structure of agents.
(a) ~ (b)
Assume (A,I',N) is not conformable, then by lemma 3.1(b) there exists a se-
quence
(Ek)k E n
C 4(I') and a number E ) 0 such that
v F E 4(i'): If F C kn1Ek then N(kn1Ek) ~ N(F) t e.
Wit.hc,ut ]oosing gencrnlity we may assume that for ever,y n E fl, Enrl C Gn
rind G~r' 1`1.~~ E C'. (We can refine the sequence such that these properties are
fulfilled.)
Now we define E:- nn1En E 6(I').
Then the statement as given above is just equivalent to the property that
for every realizable coalition F E Q(T"):
If F C E, then u(E) ) u(F) t e.-44-
Since ~(F) ~ 0, we know that u(E) ) 0 and E E(O,u(E)). Now choose the num-
ber b.- N(E) - e, then also á E(O,u(E)) and for every realizable
coalition F E S2(I") :
If F C E, then u(E) ) u(F) - b t N(E), and thus ~(F) ~ b.
Assume that
(En)n E n C Q(r) is a sequence as described in assertion (b),
and let ó E(0,{.~(E)) with E:- nnl En, be as defined in (b). Now we assume
that the coalitional structure (A,I',u) is conformable.
Take E:- K(E) - b) 0. Then by lemma 3.1(b) there exists a realizable
coalition H E Q(i'} such that H C E and u(E) ~ u(H) } E.
Hence, k(H) ) b, but by assertion (b) it is given that N(H) ( ó, which
is a contradiction. Thus we may conclude that (A,i',N) cannot be confor-
mable, which completes the proof of the assertion.
A.4 Proof of theorem .4.
Let (A,L',k) be the coalitional structure of the exchange economy E.
x
(a) Assume that the coalitional structure (A,I',u) is conformable.
Moreover, also assume that there exists a non-negligible coalition E E
ï, with u(E) ) 0, for which it holds that for every primitive coali-
tion F E I':
If F C E, then u(F) - 0.
Now by definition of conformability:
u(E) - sup { u(F) ~ E~ F E 4(i') }.-45-
Thus by our assumptions:
0~ y~(E) - sup { u(F) ~ E~ F E 4(r) }(
C sup { n~l y~(Fn) ~ N E n ; E~ Fn E r (1 t n~ N) }-
- sup {0} - 0.
This is a contradiction and thus the assertion is proved.
(b) By the participation property, assertion (a) implies the only if-part
of assertion (b) which has to be proved. Therefore we only have to
prove the if-part of the assertion:
Assume that (A,r,u) is not conformable. Then by proposition 3.3(b)
there exists a sequence of realizable coalitions (En)n E n~(r) and a
number b E(O,u(E)). where E:- nnl En and u(E) ~ 0, such that for any
realizable coalition F E 4(r) :
If F C E, then u(F) ( b.
Now define:
~:- { F E 52(r)`{fd} I F C E }.
It is evident, that if ~-~, then the assertion is true. Hence, as-
sume that ~ ~ rD.
Now we know that if F E~, then x(F) E(O,ó). (By the participation-
property we know that 52(r)`{~} only contains sets with a positive
measure.)
Now define a:- sup { u(F) ~ F E~}, Then a E(O,S] C(O,yt(E)).
Now we can take a sequence (Fn)n E n
C~ such that u(Fn) T a, n-~
Next define F:- nvl Fn, then N(F) - a and F C E.
m,-46-
Now take H:- E`F, then N(H) - u(E) - a) 0. Moreover H E E and now we
will show that for every primitive coalition M E I' with M C H it is
true that M - as.
Assume that the contrary is true, i.e. there exists a primitive coali-
tion M E i" such that M C H and u(M) ~ 0. Then we can take k E h with:
N(Fk) ~ a - F~(M)~2.
Now the coalition N:- M u Fk E~ C S2(I') since M E I" and Fk E S2(I').
Because M and Fk are disjoint (M C H, Fk C F and H n F-~) we know
that
la(N) - u(M) t u(Fk) ~ a t NÍM)~2 ) a.
This contradicts the definition of a.
So we may conclude that if ( A,I',y,) is not conformable, then there ex-
ists a coalition É E ï with K(É) ~ 0 such that for every primitive
coalition F E I':
IfFCÉ, thenF-et.
(The existence of such a coalition is shown for ~~!á, but if ~- ps
then we can evidently take É- E.)
But this conclusion contradicts the assumption that there exists a
primitive coalition F E I'`{~} with F C É. Hence we may conclude
(A,i',u) is conformable and thus the theorem is proved.
A.5 Proof of proposition .8.
Let (A,i',u) be a coalitional structure and let ,y be the collection of all
social equivalence classes of (A,I",u).- 47 -
(a) Assume LIwC E E y.
The proof is trivial for v(E) - 0. ( See Halmos ( 1950) or Zaanen
(1967).) Hence assume that v(E) ~ 0.
Let F C E and now take a coalition H E F such that F C H and u(H) -
v(F). (The existence is shown ín the text following definition 3.7.)
Now let E ) 0 and choose by application of lemma A.1 a sequence of
pairwise disjoint primitive coalitions (FFn)n E ry C I' such that
m
F C H C nuOHn ;
n~0 u(Hn) ( y,(H) t E- v(F) t 6.
Assume that HO n F~~, then E C HO E I'. (By definition of E as a so-
cial equivalence class.) So
v(E) ~ u(HO) and thus
v(E) ~ n~0 N(Hn) ~ v(F) a E.
Thus we know from the fact that e~ 0 is arbitrary and the
monotonicity of the outer measure (as shown in Halmos (1950), theorem
10.A, p.42.) : v(E) - v(F).
Now assume that (A,I',~.t) is weakly participative.
(b) Assume that E E ,y.-48-
Take F E~r with E~ F. By the weak participation property and the
definition of the social equivalence relation, we may conclude that
there exists a primitive coalition H E I" such that
ECH and FnH-rá.
(Otherwise E and F would be the same.)
Similarly we may conclude that there exists another nonempty primitive
coalition G E I" such that F C G and E n G-~.
Thus E C H`G and F C G`H .
By the definition of ttie social equivalence relation and the semi-ring
properties we conclude from the fact that E,F E~ that there exist two
primitive coalitions H,G E I" such that
ECHCH`G
FCGCG`H
Now H and G fulfill the desired properties.
(c) Define ~:- { n I'a ~ a E A}. We will prove that ,y -~.
~ C ~.
By application of the equivalence of 3.6(a) and 3.6(d) it is clear
that for any a E A, the set n i'a E y. (If b E n I"a, then i"a C I'b. )
yC~.
If a E E E~ then it is clear that E C n I'a E~. (Also by application
of proposition 3.6.) Moreover, since ~ C~ and ~r is a partition of A
we may conclude that E- n I' .
a
(d) If I' is countable, we conclude that I"a is also countable for every
agent a E A. Thus n i"a (a E A) is the intersection of countably many-49-
sets, and thus by the a-algebra properties of L it is clear that n I'
a
is a coalition for every a E A. Thus by (c) y C E.
a
A.6 Proof of theorem 3.10.
Let E be an exchange economy with coalitional structure (A,I',N). x
(a) Let Ex be socially perfectly competitive. Now take a primitive caali-
tion E E I' with N(E) ) 0, then it evident that E~ r~, i.e. there
exists an agent a E E. By definition it also clear that ~ is a parti-
tion of A. Thus there is a unique social equivalence class F E y such
that a E F. Again by the definition of the social equivalence relation
we know that F C E. Now by the social perfect competition assumption F
E i and u(F) - 0. So E`F E ï and u(E`F) - u(E) ~ 0.
Hence E`F ~ rá.
Now let b E E`F. By the same reasoning as followed for a above, we
know that there exists a unique social equivalence class G E y such
that b E G C E. Since ~ is a partition and b í~ F it is quite evident
that F n G-~. Thus we may conclude that
It { F E~r ~ F C E} ~ 2.
(b) If: Let Ex be socially perfectly competitive.
Now take a E A, then by the fact that ,y is a partition of A, there ex-
ists a unique equivalence class F E y such that a E F. Now by
assumption F is negligible, i.e. F E ï and u(F) - 0. So {a} E ï and
yt({a}) - 0. (By the measure theoretic completeness of (A,ï,u).)
Only if: Let Ex be individually perfectly competitive.-50-
Take F E y, then F ~ rd and for every agent a E F by assumption {a} E ï
and u({a}) - 0. Now take a E F. By application of lemma A.1 on the set
{a} for every E) 0, there exists a primitive coalition E E C such
that a E E and N(E) C e. But then by definition of y also F C E.
Thus we can take a sequence ( En)n E ii
C r such that for every n E ti it
holds that F C En and y~(En) C l~n .
Now we define E:- nnl En , then F C E E ï and k(E) - 0. And thus by
the measure theoretic completeness of (A,E,u), F E E and u(F) - 0.
This proves that Ex is a socially perfectly competitive economy.
Proof of theorem ~.11.
Let Ex be an exchange economy with coalitional structure (A,i",u).
(a) Assume that Ex is atomless. We will prove that Ex is socially per-
fectly competitive. Assume to the contrary that there exists an
equivalence class E E~r such that v(E) ) 0. Then by the standard argu-
ments following definition 3.7, there exists a coalition H E E such
that E C H and u(H) - v(E) ) 0.
Now apply atomlessness to establish the existence of a coalition G E E
such that G C H and 0~ u(G) C K(H) . Now we observe two cases:
I G n E- tó. Then E C H`C and thus v(E) C k(H`G) - u(H) - u(G) C y.(H) -
- v(E). Contradiction.
II G n E~ es. Then by proposition 3.8(a) v(G n E) - v(E), and thus
u(G) ) v(G n E) - v(E) - y~(H).Again we arrive at a contradiction.
Thus we may conclude that v(E) - 0 and thus E is socially perfectly x
competitive.
(b) Assume that Ex satisfies the condition as stated in the theorem.
Only if: Assume that Ex is atomless and let E E r such that y,(E) ) 0.
Then by atomlessness there exists a coalition H E i such that H C E
and 0~ u(H) ~ u(E). But then by assumption there exists a primitive
coalition F E i' such that F C H and u(F) ) 0. Hence 0~ u(F) ( u(H) ~
u(E), which proves the assertion.
If: Assume that the property as formulated in 3.11(b) is satisfied,
then we will prove that Ex is atomless.
Let E E ï be non-negligible, i.e. N(E) ) 0. Then by the flexibility
assumption on the coalitional structure there is a primitive coalition
E' E I' such that E' C E and 0~ u(E') ( u(E). Now apply the assumption
on E' then there exists another primitive coalition F E I' such that F
C E' and 0~ N(F) t u(E') ~ u(E). This completes the proof of (b).
(c) (i) ~ (ii).
This is already proven in part 3.11(a).
(ii) ---~ (iii).
If we apply the participation property, it is clear that this is al-
ready proven in theorem 3.10(a).
(iii) ~ (i).-52-
Assume that Ex has a participative coalitíonal structure and that it
satisfies the property as formulated in the theorem. Furthermore as-
sume that every nonempty primitive coalition H E I"`{~} contains at
least two social equivalence classes. (This is true by application of
(iii).) Now we will prove that Ex is atomless.
Take E E ï with K(E) ) 0. By assumption we can choose a nonempty
primitive coalition F E ï`{~} such that F C E and 0 C u(F) ~~(E).
Choose by application of (iii) two social equivalence classes H1,H2 E
y such that H1 ~e H2 and H1,H2 C F C E. Then by proposition 3.8(b),
there exist two primitive coalitions G1,G2 E I' such that
Hl C Gl , H2 C G2 and Gl n G2 -~ .
Now Hi C F n Gi and thus F n Gi ~~(i - 1,2). Thus by applying the
semi-ring properties we can take - for each index i E{1,2} - a non-
empty primitive coalition Si E I'`{~á} with
Si C (FnGi) CE .
Then by the participation property u(Si) ) 0(i - 1,2) and thus
0( u(Si) ( u(F n Gi) ~ R(F n G1) t~(F n G2) ~ u(F) ~ u(E) .
Thus we may conclude that (A,i',u) is atomless.
0i
IN 1987 REEDS VERSCHENEN
242 Gerard van den Berg
Nonstati.onarity in job search theory
24j Annie Cuyt, Brigitte Verdonk
Block-tridiagonal linear systems and branched continued fractions
244 J.C. de Vos, W. Vervaat
Local Times of Bernoulli Walk
245 Arie Kapteyn, Peter Kooreman, Rob Willemse
Some methodological issues in the implementation
of subjective poverty definitions
246 J.P.C. Kleijnen, J. Kriens, M.C.H.M. Lafleur, J.H.F. Pardoel
Sampling for Quality Inspection and Correction: AOQL Performance
Criteria
247 D.B.J. Schouten
Algemene theorie van de internationale conjuncturele en strukturele
afhankelijkheden
248 F.C. Bussemaker, W.H. Haemers, J.J. Seidel, E. Spence
On (v,k,~) graphs and designs with trivial sutomorphism group
249 Peter M. Kort




The reaction of the firm on governmental policy: a game-theoretical
approach
251 J.G. de Gooijer, R.M.J. Heuts
Higher order moments of bilinear time series processes with symmetri-
cally distributed errors
252 P.H. Stevers, P.A.M. Versteijne
Evaluatie van marketing-activiteiten
253 H.P.A. Mulders, A.J. van Reeken
DATAAL - een hulpmiddel voor onderhoud van gegevensverzamelingen
254 P. Kooreman, A. Kapteyn
On the identifiability oF household production functions with joint
products: A comment
255 B. van Riel
Was er een profit-squeeze in de Nederlandse industrie?
256 R.P. Gilles
Economies with coalitional structures and core-like equilibrium con-
ceptsii
25~ P.H.M. Ruys, G. van der Laan
Computation of an industrial equilibrium
258 W.H. Haemers, A.E. Brouwer
Association schemes
259 G.J.M. van den Boom
Some modifications and applications of Rubinstein's perfect equili-
brium model of bargaining
260 A.W.A. Boot, A.V. Thakor, G.F. Udell
Competition, Risk Neutrality and Loan Commitments
261 A.W.A. Boot, A.V. Thakor, G.F. Udell
Collateral and Borrower Risk
262 A. Kapteyn. I. Woittiez
Preference Interdependence and Habit Formation in Family Labor Supply
263 B. Bettonvil
A formal description of discrete event dynamic systems including
perturbation analysis
264 Sylvester C.W. Eijffinger
A monthly model for the monetary policy in the Netherlands
265 F. van der Ploeg, A.J. de Zeeuw
Conflict over arms accumulation in market and command economies
266 F. van der Ploeg, A.J. de Zeeuw
Perfect equilibrium in a model of competitive arms accumulation
26~ Aart de Zeeuw
Inflation and reputation: comment
268 A.J. de Zeeuw, F. van der Ploeg
Difference games and policy evaluation: a conceptual framework
269 Frederick van der Ploeg
Rationing in open economy and dynamic macroeconomics: a survey
2~0 G. van der Laan and A.J.J. Talman
Computing economic equilibria by variable dimension algorithms: state
of the art
271 C.A.J.M. Dirven and A.J.J. Talman
A simplicial algorithm for finding equilibria in economies with
linear production technologies
272 Th.E. Nijman and F.C. Palm
Consistent estimation of regression models with incompletely observed
exogenous variables
2~3 Th.E. Nijman and F.C. Palm
Predictive accuracy gain from disaggregate sampling in arima - modelsiii
2~4 Raymond H.J.M. Gradus
The net present value of governmental policy: a possible way to find
the Stackelberg solutions
275 Jack P.C. Kleijnen
A DSS for production planning: a case study including simulation and
optimization
2~6 A.M.H. Gerards
A short proof of Tutte's characterization of totally unimodular
matrices
277 Th. van de Klundert and F. van der Ploeg
Wage rigidity and capital mobility in an optimizing model of a small
open economy
2~8 Peter M. Kort
The net present value in dynamic models of the firm
2~9 Th. van de Klundert
A Macroeconomic Two-Country Model with Price-Discriminating Monopo-
lists
280 Arnoud Boot and Anjan V. Thakor
Dynamic equilibrium in a competitive credit market: intertemporal
contracting as insurance against rationing
281 Arnoud Boot and Anjan V. Thakor
Appendix: "Dynamic equilibrium in a competitive credit market:
intertemporal contracting as insurance against rationing
282 Arnoud Boot, Anjan V. Thakor and Gregory F. Udell
Credible commitments, contract enforcement problems and banks:
intermediation as credibility assurance
283 Eduard Ponds
Wage bargaining and business cycles a Goodwin-Nash model
284 Prof.Dr. hab. Stefan Mynarski
The mechanism of restoring equilibrium and stability in polish market
285 P. Meulendijks
An exercise in welfare economics (II)
286 S. Jr~rgensen, P.M. Kort, G.J.C.Th. van Schijndel
Optimal investment, financing and dividends: a Stackelberg differen-
tial game
28~ E. Nijssen, W. Reijnders
Privatisering en commercialisering; een oriëntatie ten aanzien van
verzelfstandiging
288 C.B. Mulder
Inefficiency of automatically linking unemployment benefits to priva-
te sector wage ratesiV
289 M.H.C. Paardekooper
A Quadratically convergent parallel Jacobi process for almost diago-
nal matrices with distinct eigenvalues
290 Pieter H.M. Ruys
Industries with private and public enterprises
291 J.J.A. Moors ~ J.C. van Houwelingen
Estimation of linear models with inequality restrictions
292 Arthur van Soest, Peter Kooreman
Vakantiebestemming en -bestedingen
293 Rob Alessie, Raymond Gradus, Bertrand Melenberg
The problem of not observing small expenditures in a consumer
expenditure survey
294 F. Boekema, L. Oerlemans, A.J. Hendriks
Kansrijkheid en economische potentie: Top-down en bottom-up analyses
295 Rob Alessie, Bertrand Melenberg, Guglielmo Weber
Consumption, Leisure and Earnings-Related Liquidity Constraints: A
Note
296 Arthur van Soest, Peter Kooreman
Estimation of the indirect translog demand system with binding non-
negativity constraintsV
IN 1988 REEDS VERSCHENEN
29~ Bert Bettonvil
Factor screening by sequential bifurcationIIÍ~VÍIÍINIÏI~IVIIÍVIIÍIÍÍIÍÍIMIIVÍ~IIIII